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Empire's Law
SUSAN MARKS*

On March 7, 2002, ProfessorMarks delivered the sixth annual Snyder
Lecture at the Indiana University School ofLaw-Bloomington.
In their recent book Empire Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri make the
claim that
Empire is materializing before our very eyes. Over the past
several decades, as colonial regimes were overthrown and then
precipitously after the Soviet barriers to the capitalist world
market finally collapsed, we have witnessed an irresistible and
irreversible globalization of economic and cultural exchanges.
Along with the global market and global circuits of
production has emerged a global order, a new logic and
structure of rule-in short, a new form of sovereignty. Empire
is the political subject that effectively regulates these global
exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world.'
In this lecture I want to consider what Hardt and Negri mean by this claim,
what they have in mind when they assert the emergence of a new, global order
with a "new logic and structure of rule," and what implications their analysis
might have for students of international law. To bring these issues into focus, I
propose to set them against the background of earlier meditations on the
relationship between imperialism and international law and on the significance
of the colonial encounter in the construction of international legal ideas,
concepts and categories.
But first I think it might be helpful to dwell a little on Hardt's and Negri's
central concept, announced already in the fashionably monoverbal title of their
book. For empire is, of course, a term that has many different referents and
many different inflections, and if we are to grasp the analysis put forward by
Hardt and Negri, we need to be in a position to see how their conception of
* Fellow, Emmanuel College, Cambridge. I am grateful to Scott Newton for helpful comments in the
preparation of this lecture.
I. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE, at xi (2000).

450

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 10:449

empire carries forward or departs from other ways of understanding the term.
Indeed, we need to be ready not only for comparisons with other ways of
understanding empire, but also for comparisons with its similarly polyvalent
cognates and affiliates: imperialism, colonialism, and their respective variants.
I. EMPIRE BEFORE "EMPIRE"
The word empire derives, of course, from the Latin imperium, where it
denoted the sovereignty exercised from Rome over much of the Mediterranean
world. It continues to be used in this way to refer to the phenomenon by which,
in all periods of history, nations have subjugated their neighbors and brought
expanding areas under the control of a single supreme authority. Thus,
alongside the Roman Empire, we speak of the Aztec Empire, the Chinese
Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and so on.
But then, it is not usually these cases that come to mind first when we hear
the term empire. More commonly, we have in mind European domination of
the non-European world, beginning with the adventures of the early modem
period and eventually culminating in the fateful scrambles and elaborate, if
widely diverse, colonial structures of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. One of the most obvious respects in which the European empires
differed from the other empires I have just mentioned is that those subjugated
were not from neighboring lands, but from distant places. They were
inhabitants of the Americas, Asia, Oceania, and Africa. But, of course, this is
the just the surface-level manifestation of a far deeper difference: the European
empires were associated with the phenomena of imperialism and colonialism.
In scholarly usage, a distinction is sometimes drawn between these two
terms, such that imperialism refers to the practice of ruling colonies from a
metropolitan center, while colonialism refers to the practice of founding
colonial settlements. Colonialism has its etymological roots in the Latin
colon ia, meaning a farm or settlement established in foreign territory by Roman
citizens, on the basis that Roman citizenship would be retained. By the late
Nineteenth Century, however, these practices had become linked as a result of
active policies and organized processes of territorial expansion, and this
perhaps explains why in everyday usage we tend to use the terms imperialism
and colonialism with relative interchangeability. Earlier forms of colonization
had often been small-scale, unofficial, and non-systematic initiatives, but by the
late Nineteenth Century, European states were aggressively competing to
acquire colonies. The idea that this was a "civilizing mission" pursued to
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improve the conditions of the colonized, while by no means a product of this
period, also gained ground at this time.
In the early Twentieth Century, the term imperialism took on a further
connotation, as Marxists, along with some liberals, began to concentrate on the
relationship between European imperial policy and capitalism. In perhaps the
best known work on this theme, Lenin argued that European expansion
corresponded to a particular stage in the development of capitalism. With the
growth of monopoly capitalism, capitalism had become, as he put it, "overripe., 2 More money had been generated than could profitably be invested at
home, and financiers, manufacturers, and traders thus needed to persuade their
governments to expand the terrain of investment by acquiring colonies in which
capital was lacking but labor and raw materials were abundant. Other writers
on this theme, such as Kautsky, focused less on the historical processes that led
to imperial rivalries, and more on the structure of the economic relations
involved. Either way, what is significant for our purpose is that, in these
arguments, imperialism does not refer primarily to a political system of colonial
government. Rather, it refers to a distinctive economic system, a key facet of
which is the penetration and control of markets abroad.
This had important implications in the second half of the Twentieth
Century. For if modem imperialism was simply a political system of colonial
government, then the eventual independence of the vast majority of those
colonies presumably signaled the end of imperialism. But if it was above all an
economic system, then decolonization could not be assumed to have that result.
The transformation of colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific into independent
states might affect their political relations, but it could not be assumed to put an
end to their material subordination. Thus, Kwame Nkrumah coined the term
neo-colonialism to refer to the forms of control which continued to be exercised
by metropolitan powers and other powerful nations (some of them, of course,
themselves post-colonial states) over erstwhile colonies. 3 Studies of neocolonialism, or neo-imperialism as it is sometimes also called, have described
and explained this control in a wide variety of ways and frequently on the basis
of processes which implicate all societies, including ones that never actually
were or had colonies. According to one influential theory, capitalism has
developed as an autopoietic system-in Immanuel Wallerstein's terminology, a
2. V.I. LENIN, Imperialism: The HighestStage of Capitalism, in I COLLECTED WORKS OF V.I. LENIN
495 (1917), quoted in ANTHONY BREWER, Marxist Theories ofImperialism 109, 111 (2d ed., 1990).
3. KWAME NKRUMAH, NEO-COLONIALISM: THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM (1965).
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"world-system"-in which the globe is divided into core, semi-peripheral, and
peripheral regions, linked in interlocking relations of exploitation and
4
dependency.
In the Twentieth Century's closing decades, these analyses came to be
challenged on the basis of yet another account of imperialism. In this account,
whatever the cogency of the analyses as studies of the political economy of
imperialism and neo-imperialism, they are flawed by a failure to attach
sufficient importance to ideas, images, and symbols as producers of colonial
subjectivities and reproducers of colonial relations. Like more narrowly drawn
analyses, they neglect to consider the extent to which, and the ways in which,
European imperialism was inseparable from ideas about race, sex, hygiene,
civilization, identity, property, European superiority and non-European
inferiority, not to mention (as I shall shortly discuss) sovereignty, political
community, and law. These ideas, and the diverse representational practices
through which they were articulated, helped to rationalize and legitimate
colonial rule. At the same time, however, they also created openings for anticolonial struggle, providing concepts and logics which could be turned around
against those invoking them. In path-breaking work, Edward Said showed
how, in this sense, imperialism must be grasped not merely as a political or
5
economic system, but as a cultural system as well.
Taking our cue from Said and other post-colonial theorists, we now speak
quite routinely of forms of cultural imperialism, a practice understood as
current both among societies and also within them. This brings me to one final
(though by no means the only other) way in which a variant of the term empire
has been used in recent years. In conjunction with calls for a "politics of
cultural recognition," the need has been emphasized to cultivate a post-imperial
perspective. 6 By "perspective" is meant here the attitude we adopt when
interacting with other people, nature, and the world in general, and, informing
that, the standpoint from which we contemplate how things are, how we should
live, and so on. A post-imperial perspective, as most clearly elaborated in the
work of political theorist James Tully, is a standpoint that recognizes other
standpoints.7 That is to say, it rejects as unjust the idea that issues affecting
collective life can be addressed from a fixed, unitary "Archimedean" point.
4. See generally IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY (1980).
5. See generally EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1993); EDWARD W. SAID,
ORIENTALISM (1978).
6. JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 1 (1995).
7. See generally id.

2003]

EMPIRE'S LAW

453

Thus, a post-imperial perspective eschews paternalism, embraces difference,
and seeks to devise forms of community accordingly. For Tully, a postimperial perspective is a necessary corrective to the notion (which he associates
with an imperial perspective) that belonging is to be elided with assimilation,
and association with uniformity. This notion has helped to obstruct the
demands of indigenous peoples, women, linguistic and religious minorities, and
others who remain marginalized or excluded despite the earlier waves of antiimperialist transformation. If their demands are to be met, our ethical, political,
ontological, epistemological, and even ecological deliberations must be pursued
on a more humble, less defended, and in this sense post-imperial basis. 9
I think I have now said enough to recall that empire and related words are
used in a plurality of senses, in connection with a plurality of ideas and
arguments. What sense, then, do Hardt and Negri intend when they write,not of
imperialism or neo-imperialism, and not of an empire (belonging to a particular
period) or the empire (belonging to a particular nation), but of "Empire,"
marked as a proper name by an upper-case E, yet so strangely generalized and
delocalized? For the moment, I would like us to rest content with the answer
that they do not intend any of the specific usages I have just mentioned. Their
conception draws on a number of the ideas I have touched upon, but it also
criticizes those ideas, or at any rate challenges their adequacy, and certainly
does not map squarely onto any of them. I will discuss what is involved a little
later. At this point, however, I want to stay with the more familiar notions of
empire, and introduce the question of how modem imperialism has been
understood as relating to international law. As I indicated at the beginning, this
will provide an instructive background against which to appreciate the scope
and significance of Hardt's and Negri's claims.
II. IMPERIALISM'S LAW

In addressing the question of how imperialism has been understood as
relating to international law, I will focus on two accounts, oriented to different
conceptions of imperialism. One, written in the mid-1920s by the Russian
jurist E.B. Pashukanis, quotes Lenin, and takes as its point of departure a
conception in which imperialism is above all an economic system, and

8. Id. at 7-17.
9. Id.
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specifically an articulation of capitalist patterns and logics."' The other, written
in recent years by Antony Anghie, quotes Said, and takes as its point of
departure a conception in which imperialism is also a cultural system,
constituting the subjectivities and sustaining the relationships that underpin
Western domination of the Third World." I am not sure whether it is quite fair
to juxtapose the work of these two scholars in this way. Pashukanis certainly
cannot compete, for whatever his insight, he speaks in an idiom that now seems
dated and, indeed, discredited. And Anghie for his part may not be happy to
find himself in the company of the famously authoritarian figure who ruled the
Moscow Institute of Soviet Law with an iron fist (and I mean, of course, that he
ruled what it taught) until he was purged by Stalin in 1937. But, to anticipate
my eventual argument, I believe that the two forms of critique exemplified in
the writings of these scholars are valuably brought together, especially today,
even if the Marxist critique of imperialism remains in important respects
deficient. At any rate, the two analyses will, as I said, be helpful in considering
the claims of Hardt and Negri.
A. Imperialism and InternationalLaw in Marxist Perspective
Let me begin then with Pashukanis. I draw on a text written as an entry on
international law for an Encyclopaediaof State andLaw, in which Pashukanis
develops four principal themes. In the first place, he observes that the received
definition of international law masks the specific context of rivalry among
capitalist states to which its norms are addressed.' 2 According to that
definition, international law is a system of law defining the rights and duties of
states in their mutual relations for the sake of coordinating their interests,
enabling their cooperation, and hence promoting peace. 13 Yet, as Pashukanis
sees it (writing, as I indicated, less than a decade after World War I), the basic
factor defining international law and emergent international organizations is

10. See InternationalLaw,in PASHUKANIS: SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW 168, 169-70
(Piers Beirne & Robert Sharlet eds., 1980) [hereinafter PASHUKANIS].
11. See Antony Anghie, Time Presentand Time Past: Globalization,InternationalFinancialInstitutions,
and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 243, 284 (2000); see also Antony Anghie, Findingthe
Peripheries:Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century InternationalLaw, 40 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1

(1999) [hereinafter, Anghie, Findingthe Peripheries];Antony Anghie, Franciscode Vitoria and the Colonial
Origins of InternationalLaw, 5 SOC. AND LEGAL STUD. 321 (1996) [hereinafter, Anghie, Francisco de
Vitoria].
12. PASHUKANIS, supra note 10, at 169.

13. Id.at 168.
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competitive struggle among capitalist states.14 Thus, the rhetoric of peace
conceals the essentially violent character of international relations. At the same
time, the generalized language conceals the specifically capitalist character of
the relations with which international law is concerned.
Despite this conflictual reality, Pashukanis's second major theme is that, in
his words, the "bourgeois jurists are not entirely mistaken, however, in
considering international law as a function of some ideal cultural community
which mutually connects individual states."'" This community indeed exists, at
least as an ideal, but the point is that it is based on common interests among
powerful forces within capitalist states. Societies that have not established a
capitalist mode of production are excluded from the international community,
and hence from the protection of international law. In this regard, Pashukanis
notes that whereas feudal Europe was united under a "religious notion of the
community of all Christians," the capitalist world invented the concept of
civilization "for the same purposes. ' 6 The division of states into those which
are civilized and those which are not means that capitalist states can apply
international law in their relations with one another, "while the remainder of the
world is considered as a simple object of their completed transactions.', 7 In
this way, just as the bourgeoisie dominates the proletariat at home, so too is it
able to dominate colonial countries abroad. Citing a German jurist who affirms
that relations with peoples outside the international community are not to be
judged by reference to international law, but rather "according to the bases of
the love for mankind and Christianity," Pashukanis dryly suggests that "[t]o
assess the piquancy of this assertion [one must] recall that, at the time of the
colonial wars, the representatives of these lofty principles, e.g. the French in
Madagascar and the Germans in Southwest Africa, liquidated the local
8
population without regard for age and sex."'
Pashukanis's third theme concerns the manner in which modem
international law was shaped by the development and spread of capitalism, and
especially by the need to protect property.' 9 Thus, the concept of sovereignty
and the principle that only states are fully subjects of international law responds
to the situation of strong, centralized states, in which capital requires (and
14. Id.at 169-71.
15. Id. at 171.
16. Id.at 172.
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id. at 173-78.
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finances) the prohibition of private wars, the establishment of standing armies,
the efficient administration of customs arrangements, and the energetic conduct
of colonial policy. More generally, international law structures relations
between states on the model of relations between owners of private property.
As he writes:
Sovereign states co-exist and are counterposed to one another
in exactly the same way as are individual property owners with
equal rights. Each state may "freely" dispose of its own
property, but it can gain access to another state's property only
by means of a contract on the basis of compensation.20
This is especially evident in the concepts and norms of international law
regarding territorial title, whereby state territory is figured as property, to be
bought, sold, and generally disposed of as if it were a commodity-although the
analogy is also evident, of course, in the law and practice of treaty-making. In
the passage just quoted, Pashukanis puts the word "freely" in quotation marks
when he refers to the right of states freely to dispose of their property. His
irony derives, of course, from the recognition that some states are freer to
dispose of their property in the way they wish than others. Just as the formal
equality of the parties in the sphere of private law often hides their real
inequality, so too "bourgeois international law in principle recognizes that
states have equal rights yet in reality they are unequal in their significance and
21
their power.",
In a final theme, Pashukanis turns to the character of international law as
law. He observes that in national societies, private-law relations arose in
conjunction with, and continue to depend upon, a public-law order.22 In
international law, however, the kind of institutional framework needed for such
a public-law order is largely lacking. There is no international police force
capable of enforcing international law. Does this mean, as some have argued
(and he mentions in particular Austin and a number of German jurists), that
international law is not really law? 23 For Pashukanis, this question is badly
posed, inasmuch as it treats law as a free-standing thing. It "fetishizes" law as
an objective form that magically detaches from the social relations which it
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 176.
Id.at 178.
Id.
Id.at 178-80.
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expresses and assumes an independent existence, in the same way as, according
to Marx, commodities get fetishized.24 From this perspective, those who assert
that international law is not really law simply displace the fetishism of
international law to the fetishism of law in general. As Pashukanis puts it, they
expose "fetishism in one area" but do so "at the cost of consolidating it in
others., 25 Better, as he sees it, to acknowledge that all law is precarious and
unstable than to idealize national law. Better, in other words, not to exaggerate
the autonomy and independent force of law, but to recognize instead that, by
changing the legal form of a relationship, you do not automatically change that
relationship's substantive reality. Thus, neither law in capitalist societies nor
international law must be allowed to obscure the fact that what is involved are
relations between classes, which must be confronted and transformed as such.
In this text, then, Pashukanis develops an account of the relationship
between imperialism and international law which foregrounds the extent to
which international law has been shaped by capitalism. In doing so, he
highlights issues of violence, community, property, and law that he finds
unaddressed in, and indeed mystified by, the canonical works of international
legal scholarship.
B. Imperialism and InternationalLaw in Post-ColonialPerspective
I pass now to our post-colonial theorist, Antony Anghie, who in recent
years has published a series of articles on the colonial origins of modem
international law.2 6 In traditional accounts, international law is presented as
having had to confront the phenomenon of colonialism, but the possibility is
not considered that colonialism might itself have had constititutive significance
for international law. Anghie's central thesis, however, is that the colonial
encounter in fact played a crucial role in the formation of core international
legal concepts, categories and doctrines, and especially sovereignty.27 I draw
here on two articles:one in which Anghie elaborates this thesis in relation to
very early international legal jurisprudence, 2 and another in which he
elaborates it in relation to Nineteenth-Century international legal

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 180.
Id.
See supra note 1I.
See Anghie, Franciscode Vitoria, supranote 11, at 321.
Id.
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jurisprudence.2 9 In the first of these articles, Anghie shows how in the
Sixteenth Century Francisco de Vitoria framed a conception of sovereignty that
helped to legitimate Spanish conquest and dispossession in the Americas by
defining the peoples of the region as non-sovereign. In this regard, Anghie
emphasizes that Vitoria was not simply applying a pre-existing conception of
sovereignty to this novel situation; he was creating a new conception in
response to the demands of colonial interaction. 30 Anghie describes this
process as involving the following moves.
First, Vitoria sought to demonstrate the existence of a universal system of
law that could encompass relations between the Indians and Spaniards, despite
the important differences between their respective societies.3' This could not
be, as some of his contemporaries supposed, divine law, as in his view that law
could not legitimately be applied to non-Christians. 32 It could, however, be a
secular system of natural law (jus gentium), accessible to all human beings
through the application of reason. Vitoria then proceeded to specify thisjus
gentium in a way that reflected Spanish customs and interests. In particular, he
excluded the Indians from the sphere of sovereignty, upon which key rights and
privileges depended, on the basis that their forms of political community were
inherently non-sovereign.33 This had important effects, since one of the rights
and privileges that depended upon sovereign status was the right to wage war.
In denying the Indians sovereign status, Vitoria thus denied their right
legitimately to resist incursions by the Spaniards, and conversely affirmed the
right of the Spaniards to use violence against them. In Vitoria's scheme, then,
the colonized peoples of the Americas were subject to thejus gentium only as
objects against whom the privileges of European sovereignty could be asserted
and consolidated. As Anghie puts it, the Indians were "included within the
34
system only to be disciplined.,
In the second article, Anghie concentrates on Nineteenth-Century
international legal jurisprudence, and shows how Vitoria's ideas about
sovereignty were carried forward and rearticulated in new circumstances. One
aspect of these new circumstances was, of course, intensified colonial
interaction. Another aspect, however, was a shift at the level of theory. Most
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Anghie, Findingthe Peripheries,supra note 11.
See Anghie, Franciscode Vitoria, supra note 11, at 322.
Id. at 324-25.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 331.
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European and American jurists no longer believed in the jus gentium as a
system of natural law discoverable by the application of reason. Rather, they
held to the positivist notion that international law is a system of rules created by
agreement among sovereign states. 35 According to this notion, consent, not
nature or reason, is the basis of international law, and sovereign status is in turn
the touchstone of capacity to give consent.36 Insofar as positivism was
embraced as the dominant theoretical framework, and in the light of the
intensification of colonial interaction, it thus became more important than ever
to determine which entities had sovereign status. Anghie shows how a wide
variety of concepts, categories, and doctrines were marshalled to the task first of
establishing the Western powers' right to decide on the scope of sovereign
status, and then of determining that scope in a way which excluded the peoples
of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific.3 7
One such concept was that of legal "personality., 38 The question of
sovereign status was addressed in terms of the ascription of legal personality to
a would-be sovereign state. In turn, this was addressed in terms of the further
concept of the "family of nations." 39 Non-European peoples would have legal
personality, and hence sovereign rights, if they could be seen as belonging to
the family of nations. Membership in that family, however, was indexed to a
distinction between civilized and uncivilized, according to which civilization
was identified not just with distinctively European forms of political
community, but with European social institutions and practices as well. Thus,
the family of nations functioned to enshrine a cultural criterion of participation
in the making, interpretation, and enforcement of international law. In
Anghie's account, doctrines concerned with the recognition of states were
another important element in this process of translating cultural differences into
legal ones.4° Whereas recognition presents itself as a straightforward matter of
clarifying the status of new or unknown entities, Anghie argues that it was
primarily about affirming the right of European states to allocate sovereignty,
and to do so on a racialized basis. Hence, with recognition doctrines,
sovereignty became a commodity to be granted, denied, promised, deferred, or
repackaged with strings attached. Doctrines concerning territorial title can be
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

at 2-3.
Anghie, Findingthe Peripheries,supra note 11,
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29, 34.
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analyzed in a similar way. Territory, too, was a commodity, the modes of
acquiring and disposing of which colonial powers claimed the right to control. 4 1
Anghie also discusses the ways in which principles concerning the law of
treaties were refashioned so as to assert the validity of coerced treaties.42 At the
same time, canons of interpretation were developed that worked to deny nonEuropean peoples the benefits, however dubious, of the treaties they had
concluded. Reinforcing this was a reconceptualization of these treaties as
belonging to a distinct category of treaty-making that was not dependent upon,
and thus carried no implication of, the sovereign status of the parties.43
Anghie also examines from this perspective a range of other concepts and
doctrines, but I think I have said enough to indicate the general lines of his
argument. Just as Pashukanis develops an account of the relationship between
imperialism and international law which foregrounds the extent to which
international law has been shaped by capitalism, so Anghie develops an account
of that relationship which foregrounds the extent to which international law has
been shaped by colonialism. In particular, Anghie shows how the concept of
sovereignty cannot properly be understood outside the context of its denial in
the non-European world. In this sense, as post-colonial theorists have
demonstrated in innumerable other ways as well, the non-European world
operated as the proving ground for European subjectivity-the "other" by
reference to which European identities and projects (and among the latter,
international law) were defined and realized. Like Pashukanis too, Anghie
observes that received definitions of international law, and received ways of
studying it, cannot account for these processes, and indeed only serve to
44
obscure them.
III. FROM IMPERIALISM TO "EMPIRE"
In the preceding sections, I have recalled some of the different ways in
which the term empire and its variants are used. I have also discussed
arguments about the bearing for international law of two of those usages, oneelaborated within the framework of Marxist thought-taking imperialism to be
above all about capitalist exploitation, the other-elaborated within the

41. Id. at 36-38.
42. Id. at 43-49.
43. Id. at 45, 47.
44. Id. at 78-80.
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framework of post-colonial thought-holding it to be above all about European
subjectivity and non-European exclusion. It remains now to take up Hardt's
and Negri's usage of this term. What do they mean by the claim, which appears
in the passage I quoted at the beginning of this lecture, that Empire is
materializing before our eyes? What do they mean by the claim that Empire is
the sovereign power that governs the world? What is it that is materializing and
governing?
That national governments, even the most powerful among them, face
growing difficulty in controlling the activities of business, and especially
finance, is today very widely acknowledged. The question of the significance
of this development for nation-state-based systems of power is considered by
many to be one of the most important political questions of our age. For Hardt
and Negri, however, the issue is not so much what significance the
globalization of markets has for nationstate-based systems of power. The issue,
rather, is what significance it has for the emergence of a global system of
power. Their argument is that, in circumstances of intensifying globalization,
political authority has been reconfigured to create a new, global form of
sovereignty composed of agencies which operate in diverse arenas (national,
regional, and global), yet interlock to form a single framework of governance
for the entire world. 45 That framework, and the form of sovereignty that comes
with it, is what Hardt and Negri call Empire.
In choosing this term, they explain that they seek to signal a number of
features, informed by imperial history and tradition, but reinscribed now in a
context that extends beyond any previous instantiation of empire or
imperialism. In the first place, Empire is a regime that, in their words,
"encompasses the spatial totality; ''46 that is to say, it knows no territorial
boundaries. Secondly, it also knows no "temporal boundaries," offering a
vantage point from which the past appears to have been overcome, while the
future seems to promise an everlasting present.4 7 At the same time, thirdly, it
appears to lead in a direction that joins societies across political boundaries,
inasmuch as, like previous imperial formations, it is dedicated to the
inauguration of perpetual peace (even if, like those previous formations, it
remains enmeshed with the deployment and rationalization of violence).48

45. HARDT AND NEGRI, supra note 1, at xii.

46. Id. at xiv.
47. Id. at xv.
48. Id.
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Finally, Empire knows no subject-matter boundaries. It operates on all registers
of social life: not just at the level of public regulation, but also at every other
level, right down to the "intemalised" level of self-regulation by individuals in
everyday life. 49 In all these senses Hardt and Negri propose that what makes
Empire distinctive is its character as unbounded, and hence, in their phrase,
' 50
lacking any "outside.
Discussions of globalization commonly portray the intensification of
globalizing processes as inevitable and inexorable, and invite us to celebrate or
resign ourselves to that fact, depending on our point of view. On the other
hand, many scholars and activists have criticized that perspective and exposed
it as ideological (in its effect, if not in its intention). Hardt and Negri endorse
that critique, and insist that those not content with the effects of globalization
must approach it without fatalism. Thus, in characterizing Empire as lacking an
outside, these scholars do not seek to imply that there is no escape, in the sense
that there is no scope for resistance, no possibility of transforming current
arrangements. On the contrary, they propose that there are in fact enhanced
opportunities for resistance in current conditions. 5 For the same changes that
open the way for Empire-most obviously, the revolution in communications
and information technology, but also other developments such as the rising
importance of what Hardt and Negri call "immaterial labour"5 2 (the provision of
services, intellectual work)-also open the way for "counter-imperial"
networking and action. 53 The point is simply that nostalgia for more limited
horizons and more self-sufficient times is misplaced, as too, in Hardt and
Nergi's assessment, are calls for societies at the world-systemic periphery to
"delink" from the global economy.5 4 Thus, the claim that Empire has no
outside is (among other things) a claim that the best resources for acting against
Empire may be to be found within it.
In developing these themes, Hardt and Negri discuss a wide range of
further concepts, ideas and proposals. Many of the arguments that emerge are
highly compelling. Others are perhaps less so, and it must be said that there is
at times disconcertingly little indication that the book's authors have been
chastened, as surely we must be, by the events of Twentieth-Century history.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 222.
51. Id. at 391.
52. Id. at 290-94.
53. Id. at xv.
54. Id.
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This is especially the case in their discussions of the need for overthrow of the
current order by popular forces. 55 Though the popular forces in their vision are
no longer the proletariat, but a more diverse and less unified collective subject
(which they term the "multitude"5 6), it remains less than wholly clear on what
basis we can assume that overthrow in its name will be any less disastrous than
in other notable cases. For our purposes, however (and, I think, more generally
as well), these issues are not the main point. Rather, the significance of Hardt's
and Negri's account lies in the fact that they cast the processes they describethe dispersion of power, the breaking down of boundaries, and so on-in terms
of a conception of Empire. By doing this, they establish a link between
discussions of globalization on the one hand and previous and ongoing
discussions of imperialism on the other. At least three points are suggested,
with important implications for international legal writing concerning
imperialism of the kind I illustrated in earlier sections of this lecture.
First, it is a major concern of Hardt and Negri to show that globalization
cannot adequately be understood as imperialism in new form. To many
analysts, globalizing processes are primarily about the pre-eminent position of
the United States in global affairs, its ascendancy to the role once filled by
Great Britain, among other powers. For Hardt and Negri, however, this is too
simplistic. Of course, the United States does occupy a pre-eminent position in
global affairs, but to characterize that position as neo-imperialist is to disregard
the fact that the structures of domination in today's world have changed.5 7 In
the terminology used by Hardt and Negri, a process of deterritorialization has
occurred with respect to earlier systems of exploitation and exclusion.5 8 Those
systems worked through a series of dichotomies-between ruling class and
proletariat, colonizer and colonized, core and periphery, First World and Third
World, and so on-which have more recently become fractured and blurred. 9
The Third World is now also inside the First World, and the First World inside
the Third, and this may be another sense in which there is now no "outside."
At any rate, the point is that today hierarchies are constituted and sustained by
more complex patterns and logics, which are obscured, and hence reinforced,
where globalization is elided with neo-imperialism.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 393-413.
Id.
Id. at xiv.
Id. at xii.
Id. at xiii.
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Secondly, however, it does not follow from this that attention to
imperialism and neo-imperialism is no longer necessary.
With
deterritorialization comes reterritorialization, in the sense that old dichotomies
shape the operations of the new more complex systems of domination. That is
to say, they mediate those systems, reflecting the uneven geography that is one
of globalization's most widely remarked features. Indeed, Hardt and Negri
observe that "the geographical and racial lines of oppression and exploitation
that were established during the era of colonialism and imperialism have in
many respects not declined but instead increased exponentially."' 60 This
suggests that analyses such as those I described earlier are more important than
ever, even if the first point I just highlighted makes clear that the context for
those analyses must be understood as having changed.
At the same time, thirdly, those analyses need to be treated as connected.
Addressing globalization in terms of Empire brings into focus the extent to
which globalizing processes affect and engage all domains of life, of which the
domains of "official" economic and political life may well be the least
significant. While, as I just recalled, the effects of globalization are by no
means even or uniform (and rather the reverse), Hardt and Negri show that
globalizing processes are best studied in relation to one another, as part of a
larger phenomenon, rather than in isolation or only in relation to some other set
of processes, such as those associated with imperialism.
In introducing these three points, I suggested that they had important
implications for international legal writing on imperialism. But, of course,
these same points also have important implications for international legal
writing on globalization, a topic with which a rather greater number of
international legal scholars are currently engaged. If the considerations I have
just highlighted are persuasive, then those studying globalization must begin to
consider the ways in which globalizing processes intersect with and reproduce
pre-existing forms of exploitation and exclusion. To fail to do that is to carry
forward the long and inglorious tradition in international legal scholarship,
noted by both Pashukanis and Anghie, of covering up for international law
(whether intentionally or not).

60. Id. at 43.
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IV. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

Let me now try to draw the threads of this discussion together, and touch
upon one further concept before closing. The main story of this lecture is the
one I have tried to trace through the work of Pashukanis, Anghie, and finally
Hardt and Negri. First, Pashukanis showed how international law has been
shaped by imperialism, understood primarily as an expression of capitalist
economic relations. Then Anghie showed how international law, and in
particular sovereignty doctrines, have been shaped by the colonial encounter,
viewed principally as a site for the production of identity and difference. Now
Hardt and Negri are showing how sovereignty is being reshaped through the
emergence of Empire. At the center of this story is a concept I have not
explicitly discussed so far, but do so very briefly now by way of conclusion.
This is the concept of sovereignty.
To international lawyers, sovereignty generally refers to the right of a state
to exist as an independent political community. Doctrines associated with
sovereignty include the principle that all sovereign states are equal, and the
principle that there may be no interference in the affairs of a sovereign state,
except within the established framework of international law. If Hardt and
Negri are using the term sovereignty to refer to Empire, they patently do not
have this definition and these doctrines in mind. Their point is precisely that
sovereignty has ceased to be an attribute purely of nationstate-based polities,
and has become also an attribute of the global order. Anghie characterizes
sovereignty in a broader sense as the right to exercise authority, that is to say,
the assertion of legitimate power. This seems to be what Hardt and Negri have
in mind. At the same time as he characterizes sovereignty in this way, however,
Anghie notes that for colonial peoples sovereignty operated precisely so as to
negate their right to exercise authority and assert power. It operated precisely
so as to justify injustice and violence in relations between the European and
non-European world.
Anghie's argument points to another way of thinking about the meaning of
sovereignty, which coexists in Hardt's and Negri's book with the broad
definition just mentioned. This is a conception that revolves around the
following two questions identified quite early in the book as key elements in the
"problematic of Empire": "Who will decide on the definitions of justice and
order across the expanse of this totality in the course of its process of
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constitution? Who will be able to define the concept of peace?" 6' Sovereignty,
then, appears here as the right to decide what counts as justice, the right to
define what counts as peace. 62 And if that is what sovereignty is, then it begins
to seem to all the more important to sort the imperialist legacies from the antiimperialist potentials, and the imperial tendencies from the post-imperial
pressures, within international law. Indeed, whatever our fields of legal study,
we may find it hard to escape getting drawn into struggles, not just over law's
empire, but over Empire's law.

61. Id.at 19.
62. This conception of sovereignty has close affinities with that elaborated by Carl Schmitt, though Schmitt
gave a very different account of the implications that follow. See CARL SCHMIVr, PosmoNEN UND BEGRiFFE
IM KAMPF MIT WEIMAR-GENF-VERSAILLES 1923-1939 (1940), quoted in MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, THE
GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS 429 (2001).

